The prospect of a prenatal test for autism has recently been much discussed in the media. Professor Simon Baron-Cohen, a leading expert on autism, has called for a debate about the ethics of prenatal screening for autism, and what the consequences for society might be.
The Professor is right: it is essential to debate the ethical consequences of developing a prenatal test for autism before we actually develop one. Not because the outcome of such a debate would in any way, shape or form prevent scientists from developing and using a test (let’s not be silly) but forewarned is forearmed, as the proponents of ever-more prenatal testing tell us; if a prenatal test for autism is scientifically possible it will be developed and used so we may as well get on with the arguments.
But am I the only one who feels distinctly uncomfortable with the way that this debate about the ethics of prenatal autism screening (by definition screening out, unless an in utero cure/treatment for autism is developed, which is a long way off and which, especially for people with autism, leads to a whole new set of ethical questions) is being played out in the public arena?
The question in the papers and on TV and Radio has been, more or less: what would happen if, in screening out autism, we screened out the genes for mathematical ability and abstract thinking that are so often associated with it? The test, we are told, would be unable to distinguish between high-functioning autism/Asperger syndrome and more profound varieties. Are we, as a society, prepared to accept the loss of potentially high-functioning people, including scientists and inventors, as the price to pay for screening out autism, and what are the consequences for the gene pool? “Imagine a world with no Einstein, Newton or Bill Gates” has become the buzz phrase. Here is one example: The Times, 12/01/2009, “If we screen out autism we run the risk of losing genius too.”
Whoa, easy there cowboy! That is not the ethical argument – that is a 100%, cold-blooded, profit-and-loss argument. It highlights a potential consequence, but ethics feature nowhere in it UNLESS, and here is the crucial and dangerous bit, you accept as a given the eugenicists’ guiding and fundamental principle that terminating useful people is ethically different from terminating those considered less valuable. Usually the argument for prenatal screening followed by termination is individual quality of life; not in this case. As Professor Baron-Cohen told The Guardian:
"If there was a prenatal test for autism, would this be desirable? What would we lose if children with autistic spectrum disorder were eliminated from the population? We should start debating this. There is a test for Down's syndrome and that is legal and parents exercise their right to choose termination, but autism is often linked with talent. It is a different kind of condition."
So it is ethically fine to terminate people with Down’s syndrome, because they have no talent, but if we terminate people with autism we might lose useful people?
To be fair to Professor Baron-Cohen, he is intentionally highlighting exactly the point I am attempting to raise – that to accept that someone’s possession of a certain talent has a bearing on the ethics of terminating them is to buy into the logic of eugenics – and I do not believe he meant to imply that there is no ethical dilemma around termination for Down’s syndrome.
But that particular quote highlights the danger that those of us opposed to screening out disabled people face. It is tempting in the extreme for us to use this argument to highlight the dangers of embryo screening – that humanity could suffer by screening out useful traits with the bad; throwing the genetic baby out with the bath water, to coin a phrase. But it is a convenient and seductive honey-trap that distracts attention from the real ethical question in prenatal screening, namely is it ethical to use a subjective and speculative medical-model assessment of the value and quality of someone's life as grounds for abortion?
If we go along with the argument that the ethical dilemma in prenatal autism screening is the possible termination of socially valuable people along with the others, then the result will be that the eugenicists have won by default, because in doing so we will begin to acknowledge that some disabled people are more valuable than others.
So by all means point out what society potentially has to lose by screening out people with disabilities, but don’t let people get away with claiming that this is the ethical dilemma in prenatal screening. If this becomes the public focus of the debate then any discussion of the actual ethics of terminating disabled people will have been smothered and suppressed, to the great benefit of those who advocate automatic termination on the grounds of disability.
The Professor is right: it is essential to debate the ethical consequences of developing a prenatal test for autism before we actually develop one. Not because the outcome of such a debate would in any way, shape or form prevent scientists from developing and using a test (let’s not be silly) but forewarned is forearmed, as the proponents of ever-more prenatal testing tell us; if a prenatal test for autism is scientifically possible it will be developed and used so we may as well get on with the arguments.
But am I the only one who feels distinctly uncomfortable with the way that this debate about the ethics of prenatal autism screening (by definition screening out, unless an in utero cure/treatment for autism is developed, which is a long way off and which, especially for people with autism, leads to a whole new set of ethical questions) is being played out in the public arena?
The question in the papers and on TV and Radio has been, more or less: what would happen if, in screening out autism, we screened out the genes for mathematical ability and abstract thinking that are so often associated with it? The test, we are told, would be unable to distinguish between high-functioning autism/Asperger syndrome and more profound varieties. Are we, as a society, prepared to accept the loss of potentially high-functioning people, including scientists and inventors, as the price to pay for screening out autism, and what are the consequences for the gene pool? “Imagine a world with no Einstein, Newton or Bill Gates” has become the buzz phrase. Here is one example: The Times, 12/01/2009, “If we screen out autism we run the risk of losing genius too.”
Whoa, easy there cowboy! That is not the ethical argument – that is a 100%, cold-blooded, profit-and-loss argument. It highlights a potential consequence, but ethics feature nowhere in it UNLESS, and here is the crucial and dangerous bit, you accept as a given the eugenicists’ guiding and fundamental principle that terminating useful people is ethically different from terminating those considered less valuable. Usually the argument for prenatal screening followed by termination is individual quality of life; not in this case. As Professor Baron-Cohen told The Guardian:
"If there was a prenatal test for autism, would this be desirable? What would we lose if children with autistic spectrum disorder were eliminated from the population? We should start debating this. There is a test for Down's syndrome and that is legal and parents exercise their right to choose termination, but autism is often linked with talent. It is a different kind of condition."
So it is ethically fine to terminate people with Down’s syndrome, because they have no talent, but if we terminate people with autism we might lose useful people?
To be fair to Professor Baron-Cohen, he is intentionally highlighting exactly the point I am attempting to raise – that to accept that someone’s possession of a certain talent has a bearing on the ethics of terminating them is to buy into the logic of eugenics – and I do not believe he meant to imply that there is no ethical dilemma around termination for Down’s syndrome.
But that particular quote highlights the danger that those of us opposed to screening out disabled people face. It is tempting in the extreme for us to use this argument to highlight the dangers of embryo screening – that humanity could suffer by screening out useful traits with the bad; throwing the genetic baby out with the bath water, to coin a phrase. But it is a convenient and seductive honey-trap that distracts attention from the real ethical question in prenatal screening, namely is it ethical to use a subjective and speculative medical-model assessment of the value and quality of someone's life as grounds for abortion?
If we go along with the argument that the ethical dilemma in prenatal autism screening is the possible termination of socially valuable people along with the others, then the result will be that the eugenicists have won by default, because in doing so we will begin to acknowledge that some disabled people are more valuable than others.
So by all means point out what society potentially has to lose by screening out people with disabilities, but don’t let people get away with claiming that this is the ethical dilemma in prenatal screening. If this becomes the public focus of the debate then any discussion of the actual ethics of terminating disabled people will have been smothered and suppressed, to the great benefit of those who advocate automatic termination on the grounds of disability.
A little Einstein or Newton or Bill Gates has no more right to be born, to be happy, and to be valued as a human being than a little person with more profound autism or Down’s syndrome or any other disability. In their essential humanity they are one and the same, and if we ever lose sight of that then those who seek to divide the human species into the useful and the useless, those who have a right to exist and those who don’t, will have won an easy victory.
